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Abstract 
 
The present study examines how emotion affects false memory formation using the 
backwards causal-inference paradigm, with a developmental perspective.  
One-hundred-and-thirty-two children participated in the study, with 56 children aged 6-8 
years, 43 children aged 9-10 years and 33 children aged 11-12 years. The children were 
presented with one of six different PowerPoints, which all displayed the same scripts in 
photographs, but differed in emotional (positive vs. negative vs. neutral) outcome of the 
script. After a retention interval, the children were presented with 30 photographs previously 
displayed, and 30 photographs that were new. The children then expressed which of the 
pictures they had seen or not with a simple “yes” or “no” response. Children aged 9-10 were 
significantly better at discriminating between old and new pictures compared to children aged 
6-8. The children aged 11-12 were not significantly different from the other age groups. No 
significant developmental reversals were revealed. Regardless of age, the children made 
significantly fewer gap-filling errors than causal errors. There was a significantly lower rate 
of memory errors for positive stimuli than for both negative and neutral stimuli, and a 
significantly more liberal bias for positive and negative scripts than for neutral scripts when 
using the response criterion. No significant main effect of emotion was found using the 
discrimination accuracy index.  
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 1 
Introduction 
 
Human memory is generally well adapted to everyday situations through evolution 
(Schacter, 1996), but even so, it is not without faults. During the last decades, the nature of 
memory has been questioned in several court trials, particularly in those involving children as 
witnesses. In infamous and controversial cases such as the Bjugn-affair (see Magnussen, 
2004), the Little Rascals preschool case, and the McMartin Preschool Trial (for reviews, see 
Sabbagh, 2009; Schacter, 1996) the suggestibility and credibility of children has been 
scrutinised. This has generated extensive research and debate about the formation of false 
memory, a dispute so controversial that it has been called “The Memory Wars” (Schacter, 
1996). Even so, there is still not consensus on how emotions affect memory errors from a 
developmental perspective (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Brainerd & Reyna, 2012). In a 
courtroom, the common denominator is often the emotionality of the event investigated. How 
development affects the impact of emotion on memory errors is therefore of utter importance 
both in forensic situations and from a scientific perspective (Brainerd, Holliday, Reyna, 
Yang, & Toglia, 2010). 
Memory is part of a cognitive system, capable of both constructing and reconstructing 
information (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). Similar processes thus generate both accurate and 
inaccurate memory. The present study takes place in a controlled environment, which makes 
it readily to evaluate whether reports of scripted events are accurate or not. This is opposed to 
reports in a courtroom where there is no certain way of knowing if a statement is affected by 
memory distortions. The paradigm employed investigates inferential memory errors via the 
incorrect retrieval of a presented story-script, measuring how emotions affect memory for 
causal inferences and gap-filling errors in children.  
 
Human Memory and its General Development 
 
Episodic and semantic memories are both forms of explicit or declarative memory. 
Episodic memory is defined as the retrieval of events and previous experiences, whereas 
semantic memory is our generic, factual knowledge about the world (Goswami, 2008). These 
memories can be brought to mind consciously and deliberately. Explicit memories are often 
contrasted with implicit memories, which are procedural memories that make changes in 
performance without the involvement of consciousness (Schacter, 1996). In cognitive 
psychology, memory is assumed to be a modular system, with long-term memory divided 
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into explicit and implicit memory, and episodic-, semantic- as well as procedural memory 
considered to be distinctive in various ways. Thus, these different types of memory are 
usually considered independently of each other in cognitive research. Further, this modular 
approach is supported by cognitive neuroscience, with different types of memory appearing 
to rely on different anatomical structures in the brain (Goswami, 2008). The present study 
aims at addressing a phenomenon pertaining to episodic memory. 
Children and adults construct their episodic memories, and that process depends on 
prior knowledge and personal interpretations (Goswami, 2008). From early on, children 
remember events that are important in their everyday life, merging these memories into 
scripts such as the usual bedtime-routine, and episodic memory thus develops (Nelson, De 
Haan, & Thomas, 2006). The construction of memories may also depend on how much sense 
a person can make of their experiences (Schacter, 1996). Very young children may not 
structure their experiences in memorable ways, especially if they do not understand their own 
experiences or do not have a clear temporal framework. Memory development is integrated 
in larger social and cognitive activities, and should therefore be looked at in context with 
other developmental processes. 
 Several studies have used tasks and procedures derived from larger social and 
cognitive developmental perspectives, attempting to provide a purer measure of a particular 
memory system of interest in order to figure out its contribution to human memory (for a 
review, see Brainerd & Reyna, 2012). Episodic memory is typically measured by standard 
tests of recall and recognition (Cooper & Schacter, 1992; Gallo, 2013; Nelson et al., 2006). 
Recall memory is the ability to actively recall previous experiences (Goswami, 2008), 
whereas recognition memory is the ability to identify a stimulus as previously encountered 
(Ghetti & Angelini, 2008).  
 Until recently, most attention has been allocated to research of true memory (Brainerd 
& Reyna, 2005). However, cases of people recovering previously unsuspected memories of 
childhood abuse, sketchy interrogations, confessions based on unreliable reports, and leading 
questionings, especially with children involved, has turned the attention towards false 
memories (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Ceci & Bruck, 1995; Magnussen, 2004). False memory 
refers in a very general way to circumstances where one is convinced of definitive memories 
of an event that did not actually happen (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). Fuzzy-trace theory (FTT) 
is a contemporary theory developed by Brainerd and Reyna (1995) that explains false-
memory phenomena. 
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Fuzzy-Trace Theory 
 FTT posits two types of memory processes, and has therefore been referred to as a 
dual process theory (Brainerd & Reyna, 2002). The core idea of FTT is that false-memory 
responses are affected by two mechanisms; recollection and familiarity, which operate in 
opposition to each other (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). Recollection involves recovery of 
qualitative information associated with the context in which the event was encountered. As 
usually prompted by a critical cue, this induces a subjective sense of vivid reliving of one’s 
personal past (Brainerd, Holliday, & Reyna, 2004). A familiarity process, on the other hand, 
allows for a general sense of “oldness” about an item, where a memory trace is assessed 
without the ability to retrieve any qualitative details about the specific event (Lyons, Ghetti, 
& Cornoldi, 2010). 
 A variety of evidence concludes that the human brain deposits dissociated verbatim 
and gist traces of experience (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). FTT supposes that verbatim traces 
are detailed integrated representations of several surface features, and other item-specific 
information, requiring a recollective retrieval (Brainerd & Reyna, 2004; Brainerd, Reyna, & 
Forrest, 2002). The retrieval of such traces in memory tests induces a vivid mental 
reinstatement of experiences accompanied by targets of earlier presentations. Forgetting of 
verbatim traces thus creates disintegration of features (Reyna & Titcomb, 1997). On the other 
hand, the representations of gist traces are episodic interpretations of concepts as meanings, 
relations, and patterns (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). These concepts are elaborations generated 
by a person while encoding the targets’ surface form.  
 The main difference between verbatim and gist information is that verbatim 
information is part of the memory experienced by the subjects (i.e., remembering details of 
the story and what the photographs looked like), whereas gist information must be added to 
the experience by the subjects themselves (i.e., the general meaning of the script) (Brainerd & 
Reyna, 2004). The initial encoding of experiences’ surface features (verbatim trace) is 
assumed to initiate a corresponding mechanism of meaning access and elaboration (gist 
trace), and these different mechanisms of storage run in parallel while encoding continues.    
 FTT assumes that in true recall or recognition of verbatim traces, a lifelike form of 
remembering occurs, where subjects feel they are consciously re-experiencing targets’ 
occurrence in specific contexts (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). This is traditionally called 
recollection in dual process theories. Verbatim retrieval is assumed to predominate with 
targets, but sometimes the targets may fail to evoke verbatim retrieval and may instead evoke 
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gist retrieval. Gist retrieval usually evokes a more global and inchoate form of remembering, 
called familiarity in dual process theories. In false memory, verbatim and gist retrieval are 
assumed to be opponent processes, with gist retrieval supporting false-memory responses, 
and verbatim retrieval suppressing them (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005).  
 
Developmental Reversals 
 Cognitive factors as source-monitoring, social factors as susceptibility to persuasion, 
metacognitive factors as introspective awareness of memory state, and neurobiological 
factors as maturation of the prefrontal cortex, all contribute to promote memory accuracy and 
resistance to suggestion (Brainerd, Reyna, & Ceci, 2008). Together these processes ensure 
age declines in memory distortions. Several studies have found robust increases in 
recognition and recall memory, in part due to the development of the above-mentioned 
factors (Ackerman, 1984; Davidson & Hoe, 1993; Lindsay, Johnson, & Kwon, 1991). 
 In recent years, exceptions have been found to the general allegation of age decline in 
false memory. These exceptions have been predicted by the FTT (Brainerd & Reyna, 1998). 
Several studies have found methods that detect age increases in false memory, and some even 
with a net decline in accuracy (see Brainerd, Reyna, & Ceci, 2008, for a review; Lyons et al., 
2010). Previous research indicates that the propensity to form false memories decreases with 
age when children are exposed to social pressure (Bruck & Ceci, 1999) or when they fail to 
correctly recognize the source the information originally was coming from, especially when 
the sources are highly similar to one another (Lindsay et al., 1991). However, when children 
falsely remember the underlying gist of events, developmental increases in false memories 
have been observed (Brainerd & Reyna, 2012; Brainerd, Reyna, & Ceci, 2008; Lyons et al., 
2010). Several studies supporting the FTT have found age increases in false memory to be 
due to improvement in children’s memory for semantic gist (Brainerd et al., 2010; Gallo, 
2013). Because of the increase in false memory formation as a function of age, this 
developmental pattern has acquired the name “developmental reversals” (Brainerd, Reyna, & 
Ceci, 2000). 
  
The Deese Roediger-McDermott-Paradigm 
 The Deese Roediger-McDermott paradigm (DRM), created by Deese (1959) and 
Roediger and McDermott (1995), is a frequently used paradigm that has shed some light on 
the development of false memory formation, supporting the predictions of FTT (Anastasi & 
Rhodes, 2008; Brainerd, Forrest, Karibian, & Reyna, 2006; Dewhurst, Pursglove, & Lewis, 
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2007; Howe, Cicchetti, Toth, & Cerrito, 2004) This paradigm is carried out by the use of 
word lists where a familiar stimulus word like “doctor” is chosen, and a word list is created 
by selecting 12-15 semantic associates to that word (nurse, needle, hospital, sick etc.) These 
associated words are then presented to the participants without the stimulus word “doctor” 
(i.e., the critical lure). Subsequently after having studied the word list, the participants make 
old/new recognition judgments of actually studied words, critical lures, and other lures that 
are not semantically related (e.g., ocean) to the studied materials. Older children and adults 
have been shown to falsely recognize critical lures and correctly recognize studied words 
(Roediger & McDermott, 1995). This is due to older children’s and adult’s ability to connect 
the meaning of studied words, leading the critical lure to be coded along with the items 
studied during the encoding phase. In the DRM-paradigm, this effect has been shown to 
increase with age, causing an age-increase in memory distortion (Brainerd et al., 2004; 
Brainerd & Reyna, 2012; Brainerd, Reyna, Ceci, & Holliday, 2008; Holliday, Brainerd, & 
Reyna, 2011; Howe, 2007; Metzger et al., 2008; but see Ghetti, Quin, & Goodman, 2002).  
 Firm conclusions on developmental reversals can however not be drawn from studies 
using the DRM-paradigm alone, as age-increases in memory errors using this paradigm may 
also be due to age-related increases in children’s ability to detect relations among items on 
the word-list (e.g. Brainerd, Reyna, & Ceci, 2008; Howe, 2007; Lyons et al., 2010). Thus, a 
new memory paradigm has been developed to better study the developmental reversals 
suggested in FTT (Hannigan & Reinitz, 2001; Lyons et al., 2010).   
 
Two Different Mechanisms: Gap-Filling Errors and Causal Errors 
 Hannigan and Reinitz (2001) found evidence of two different mechanisms underlying 
inference-based memory errors, with schema-based memory errors (gap-filling errors) likely 
to be fundamentally different from errors based on causal inference (causal errors). Gap-
filling errors can be defined as erroneously remembering script-consistent distractor images, 
whereas causal error is erroneously remembering the not seen cause of previously seen 
effects (Mirandola, Toffalini, Grassano, Cornoldi, & Melinder, 2013).  
 Hannigan and Reinitz (2001) found that gap-filling errors were associated with 
“know” responses, indicating that they tended to be based on a feeling of familiarity. Causal 
errors were however associated with “remember” responses, indicating that they tended to be 
based on an explicit recollection from the encoding phase. This led the authors to the 
conclusion that recollection supports causal-errors, and that familiarity supports gap-filling 
errors. Hannigan and Reinitz (2001) thus suggest that gap-filling errors resulting from 
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familiarity is due to an activation of generic semantic information or knowledge in memory. 
Further, they theorize causal errors to occur when people falsely recall having experienced a 
specific item, and thus not remembering that the memory is actually an inference they made 
themselves based on a picture which showed the effect of an event during encoding  
 
The Backward Causal-Inference Paradigm 
 
 Based on the above-mentioned dissociations in recognition memory, a relatively new 
paradigm named the Backward Causal-Inference Paradigm was developed by Hannigan & 
Reinitz (2001). This paradigm has later been applied to further explore the effects of age-
related increases in false-memory formation (Lyons et al., 2010). In this paradigm, series of 
photographs are composed together to form a story-script (e.g. eating at a restaurant). The 
series include photographs of effects (e.g., wiping up water from a table) and non-presented 
causes (e.g., knocking over a glass of water), as well as script-consistent and script-
inconsistent photographs. After a retention interval the participants complete a yes/no 
recognition test. The test includes the causes (e.g. knocking over a glass of water) whose 
effect-photograph had been seen during encoding (e.g. wiping up water from a table), as well 
as new and old script-consistent and script-inconsistent photographs (Hannigan & Reinitz, 
2001; Lyons et al., 2010; Mirandola, Paparella, Re, Ghetti, & Cornoldi, 2012; Mirandola et 
al., 2013).  
Hannigan and Reinitz (2001) originally presented the material to adults testing for 
memory-distortion, but the backward causal-inference paradigm also allows testing for age 
differences. This was first done by Lyons and colleagues (2010), who presented the paradigm 
to typically developing children. In contrast to the DRM-paradigm, the backward causal-
inference paradigm does not rely on the ability to detect the overall theme of a word-list 
across multiple items, and may therefore provide a better distinction between the 
developments of recollection- and familiarity-based errors (Lyons et al., 2010).  
 With the backwards-causal inference paradigm being relatively new, few studies have 
been conducted using this paradigm on adults, and even fever with the aim of exploring the 
development of memory distortions in children. The former mentioned study of Lyons and 
colleagues (2010) tested 6-, 7-, 9-, 10-, and 18-year olds for memory distortions focusing on 
backward causal errors and gap-filling errors. As predicted, they found that although age-
related increases in backward causal inference errors were observed, gap-filling errors were 
age-invariant. Six year olds did not show backward causal inference errors, whereas the older 
 7 
groups did. Adults were significantly more likely to show this effect compared to the 
youngest children. A significant age-increase in causal errors between six year olds and nine 
year olds and adults was detected, and all age groups except six year olds showed backward 
causal-inference errors significantly different from zero. Regarding gap-filling errors, no 
significant age-related differences were detected.  
In a study by Mirandola and colleagues (2012) the paradigm was presented to 
children with attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder. Later, a modified version of the 
paradigm adapted to include a difference in emotional content was presented to adults 
(Mirandola et al. 2013). Another study using the Backwards Causal-Inference Paradigm with 
emotional content included children with learning disabilities, but did not include a 
developmental perspective (Mirandola, Losito, Ghetti, & Cornoldi, 2014).  
 Developmental improvements in the ability to form meaning connections between 
experiences are necessary to produce age-increases in false memory (Brainerd, Reyna, & 
Ceci, 2008). The enhancement in forming of meaningful connections is predicted to lead to a 
developmental increase in backwards-causal memory errors. This is because older children 
may falsely recollect the causal photographs, confusing them for causal inferences they made 
when viewing corresponding effect photographs during encoding (Lyons et al., 2010). 
 
How does Emotional Memory Differ from Neutral Memory?  
 
Emotionality has been indicated to influence explicit memory regarding the number of 
events remembered as well as the quality and accuracy of memory (for a review, see 
Kensinger & Schacter, 2008). Emotional events have repeatedly been found to be better 
remembered than neutral events (for reviews, see Brainerd & Reyna, 2012; Buchanan & 
Adolphs, 2002) in both children and adults, and in the laboratory as well as in more 
naturalistic settings (Burgwyn-Bailes, Baker-Ward, Gordon, & Ornstein, 2001). The 
heightened true memory for emotional stimuli has been suggested attributed to the higher 
evolutionary benefit of recognizing and remembering potentially dangerous or rewarding 
situations rather than neutral situations (Wright, 1994). Regarding false memory, differences 
in memory errors have been suggested to be an effect of more fluently processing negative 
stimuli, leading people to falsely believe that they recognize an item (Kensinger & Schacter, 
2008). Research on the effect of emotionality on memory has mostly focused on negative 
emotion, and more precisely, on eyewitness-memory, flashbulb memories, and traumatic 
memories (Schooler & Eich, 2000).  
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Positive vs. Negative Memories 
Flashbulb-memory (Brown & Kulik, 1977) was an early concept in the field of 
emotional memory research. These memories are described as highly emotional, and the 
theory states that the traumatic content enhances how much one might remember. However, 
later research has suggested strong source amnesia for these events. One might believe that 
the memory is very strong and robust for one’s own flashbulb-memories, but the subjective 
confidence in this is often not matched by the objective accuracy (Schacter, 1996). This 
indicates how the strong emotionality of a memory might intervene with accuracy, making it 
a false memory. Research with children has suggested traumatic memory to be influenced by 
the same variables as non-traumatic memory, but that the distinctiveness of the situation will 
enhance the memory (for a review, see Cordon, Pipe, Sayfan, Melinder, & Goodman, 2004).  
As the majority of research on emotional memories investigate differences between 
neutral and negative memories, less in known about the effect of positive emotion on 
memory. There has however been a tendency to focus more on the effects of positive emotion 
in recent years (Brainerd et al., 2010; Brainerd, Stein, et al., 2008). It is important to 
differentiate not only between neutral and emotional stimuli, but also between positive and 
negative, as these emotions have in the limited research conducted been indicated to have 
opposite effects on familiarity and use of verbatim suppression (Brainerd et al., 2010; 
Brainerd, Stein, et al., 2008). In a previous study on children’s episodic memory, children 
reported their own narratives for either positive or negative events (Fivush, Hazzard, 
McDermott Sales, Sarfati, & Brown, 2003). The children reported more objects, people and 
details for positive experiences, and more information of their own thoughts and emotions for 
negative events. Controlled research on memory differences for positive and negative story-
scripts could therefore help to further understand differences in how children both accurately 
and falsely remember events that differ in emotionality.  
 
Valence and Arousal 
Emotionality does not only differ between positive or negative, but can also be 
divided into valence (emotional response) and arousal (intensity of response). Both the 
valence of stimuli and the level of arousal it induces has been shown to influence memory 
(Bradley & Lang, 1994), but with divergent effects (Kensinger, 2004). The general tendency 
is towards negatively valenced pictures being remembered better than neutrally valenced 
pictures (Christianson, 1992; Cordon, Melinder, Goodman, & Edelstein, 2013; Kensinger & 
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Corkin, 2003; Oschner, 2000), and high and moderate arousing stimuli remembered better 
than low arousing stimuli (Brainerd et al., 2010; Cordon et al., 2013; Kensinger & Corkin, 
2003; Oschner, 2000) for both children and adults.  
Valence and arousal are variables used in several studies, but a minority of research 
do control for the different influences they have on memory (Kensinger, 2004). In such 
controlled studies with adults, the effect of arousal has been indicated to be larger than the 
effect of valence (Kensinger, 2004; Kensinger & Corkin, 2003). The sparse age-normed 
valence and arousal research in children has indicated less clear tendencies (Brainerd et al., 
2010; Cordon et al., 2013). Age-norming emotional stimuli is important as valence and 
arousal ratings seem to be a function of age, and the validity of studies without age-normed 
material have thus been questioned (Cordon et al., 2013).  
 
Why is there an Effect of Emotionality on False Memory?  
The effect of differently valenced stimuli on false memory is proposed explained by 
FTT (Brainerd et al., 2010; Brainerd, Stein et al., 2008). Brainerd, Stein and colleagues 
(2008) used recognition of DRM-lists with different valences that did not differ regarding 
arousal. The results indicated a higher degree of false recognition for negatively valenced 
compared to neutrally valenced distractors, which is the common tendency (see Kensinger & 
Schachter, 2008, for a review). They also found more memory errors for neutral than for 
positive distractors. In line with FTT, the authors accounted this to be a factor of the impact 
of valence on both similarity judgment, which is falsely accepting seemingly familiar 
material by processing gist traces, and recollection rejection, which is the tendency to use 
verbatim-memory to supress a false acceptance of critical distractors. The similarity 
parameter for critical distractors increased from positive to negative distractors, with neutral 
distractors in the middle. Therefore, negative valenced stimuli induced the highest level of 
familiarity in the participants, with positive stimuli inducing the lowest level of familiarity. 
The level of recollection rejection decreased from positive to negative valence, with again, 
neutral scoring in between. Therefore, negatively valenced stimuli shows the highest level of 
false recognition as it both induces a high level of meaning familiarity, and less ability to use 
verbatim memory to supress the false acceptance of these seemingly familiar items (Brainerd, 
Stein et al., 2008) 
As this different effect of emotional stimuli on memory errors was found in university 
students, (Brainerd, Stein, et al., 2008) the development of this effect has been further 
investigated. As an effect of FTT, this tendency is thought to increase with age, with a 
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positive correlation between development and false memory for negative stimuli (Brainerd & 
Reyna, 2012). According to FTT, emotional valence will result in the same developmental 
trends as semantic gist will, as it is a conceptual aspect of the event (Brainerd & Reyna, 2012; 
Brainerd, Stein, et al., 2008: Rivers, Reyna, & Mills, 2008). Therefore, the valence of an 
emotional situation will lead to a developmental increase in false memories as a factor of gist, 
as the ability to catch the meaning will increase with age. Arousal is viewed as a concept of 
verbatim memory, as it is non-conceptual (Brainerd & Reyna, 2012). Higher arousal in an 
emotional situation will also lead to a developmental increase in false memories, but as a 
factor of verbatim experience.   
Supporting this, an age-increase in false memory from the age of seven to the age of 
11 years, and onwards to young adults, has been found for negative stimuli (Brainerd et al, 
2010). The higher degree of false memories for negative stimuli relatively to neutral or 
positive stimuli is hypothesized to emerge between the ages of seven and 11 years. This is 
supported by no significant difference in memory errors for positive and negative stimuli for 
the seven-year-olds, and 11-year-olds having a significantly higher degree of false memories 
for negative than for positive stimuli (Brainerd et al, 2010). Between the age of 11 and 20 
years, false memories increased the same amount for both negative and positive stimuli, 
indicating that the differentiation in memory errors between negative and positive stimuli 
occurs before the age of 11 years.  
Fitting with this theory of a developmental increase in emotional false memories, 
Howe (2007) found the age-increase in false recognition memory to be highest for negative 
rather than for neutral stimuli. The tendency has been, as suggested by several other 
recognition studies, for children to have an increase in false memories with age, especially 
for negative stimuli (see Brainerd & Reyna, 2012, for a review; Howe et al., 2010; Mirandola 
et al., 2014). However, the tendency for a lower proportion of inferential errors in negative 
stimuli rather than neutral stimuli has been reported in other studies with children (Ceci, 
Lofthus, Leichtman, & Bruck, 1994; Mirandola et al., 2013; Otgaar, Peters, & Howe, 2012). 
Mirandola and colleagues (2013) attributed this finding to a finer discrimination for 
emotional stimuli than for neutral stimuli. 
Conflicting data has thus been found on the effect of emotion on discriminability. 
Reduced discriminability for emotional stimuli has been found, with children having a 
reduced capacity to discriminate false from true memories in emotional events (Howe, 2007), 
and a higher capacity for discriminating in neutral events. A more liberal bias for negative 
stimuli than for neutral stimuli has also been found (Mirandola et al, 2013), indicating that 
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children are more prone to falsely accept negative stimuli. These divergent results might be a 
factor of different types of stimuli used in testing.    
In developmental research, stronger effects of valence have been found with recall 
memory than with recognition memory (Burell, 2013; Ceci & Bruck, 1993, but see Howe, 
2007). Recognition memory might not be as influenced by valence because it is possible to 
truly recognize stimuli without correctly remembering the source of the memory (Kensinger 
& Schacter, 2008), and thus not remember the emotion.  It is nevertheless important to keep 
in mind that the Backwards Causal-Inference Paradigm using pictures of varying valence has 
at the present date not been used in developmental research before, so the conclusions for the 
above mentioned studies might not apply for the present study. 
 
The Present Study 
 
 The aim of this study is to examine inferential memory error (i.e., gap-filling errors 
and causal errors) in recognition memory of a presented picture story-script. Children aged 
six to 12 years were presented with six different story-scripts of positive, negative, and 
neutral content. After a five-minute retention interval a recognition test was presented where 
the children discriminated between unseen (new) and previously seen (old) pictures.   
Positive content has for the first time been included in this paradigm, and is likely the 
first of its kind to be used on typically developing children with the aim of examining effects 
of age-related increases in false-memory formation. The positive content has been added to 
further investigate the role of emotionality, and to investigate if there is a general difference 
in impact on false memory between emotional and neutral stimuli, or if there is an added 
difference between types of emotionality.  
The age-range for this study was selected based on theoretical hypotheses suggesting 
that recollection emerges later, and shows more developmental change than familiarity 
(Ghetti & Angelini, 2008). Studies have shown that the subjective experience of recollection 
is not present until a certain age (Perner & Ruffman, 1995). Before children are three to six 
years old, they may not be able to differentiate among belief, knowledge, and memory, and 
are therefore not able to experience recollection as a different memory state from familiarity, 
indicating that recollection emerges from an earlier state of general familiarity (Ghetti & 
Angelini, 2008).  
Based on previous research three main hypotheses were proposed. In the first 
hypothesis, age-related decreases in overall memory distortions were expected, as numerous 
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studies show that memory-performance enhances as children develop (Ceci & Bruck, 1993; 
Lindsay et al., 1991). 
The second hypothesis was based on previous research (Lyons et al., 2010) using the 
same paradigm. There is reason to assume that age-differences should result in age-related 
differences in the two memory-processes; familiarity and recollection. The familiarity-based 
memory distortions (gap-filling errors) should be quite age-invariant, whereas recollection-
based distortions (causal errors) should increase with age. This age-increase in causal errors 
could thus mean that younger children will on average have higher proportions of their total 
correct scores coming from correctly rejecting cause pictures rather than gap-filling pictures. 
 The third hypothesis states that children, regardless of age, were expected to have 
more false alarms for negative stimuli, than for neutral stimuli, and the lowest rate of false 
alarms for positive stimuli. Negative stimuli have been found to induce a higher level of 
meaning familiarity, and a lesser ability to use verbatim memory to supress the false 
acceptance of these seemingly familiar items, therefore causing a higher degree of false 
alarms (Brainerd, Stein, et al., 2008).   
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Method 
 
Participants  
 
One hundred and thirty two children participated in the study. Fifty six children were 
between six and eight years old (M = 6.92, SD = 0.94, 29 males), 43 were between nine and 
10 years (M = 9.58, SD = 0.50, 19 males) and 33 children belonged to the group between 11 
and 12 years of age (M = 11.52, SD = 0.51, 16 males). One child was eliminated from further 
analysis, as he was not able to perform the recognition-phase because of a developmental 
disability. Participants attended one of two elementary schools in two major Norwegian 
cities, where a total of 250 children were contacted. Both the children and their guardians 
signed individual consent forms that were delivered to the guardians by envelopes in their 
children’s backpacks.  
Materials 
 
 Scripts consisting of colour photographs were used. A script is a story shown in 
pictures, and these scripts depicted people engaged in every day routines, inspired by 
Hannigan and Reinitz (2001). Originally the paradigm consisted of nine different scripts. A 
pilot study in two parts was conducted, qualifying six scripts to be part of the present 
experiment. For further elaboration, see the section of the pilot study. 
 
Pictorial Stimuli and Apparatus 
The apparatus included a computer with a 13’’ monitor, set on a table in front of the 
participant. Each script contained a causal pattern, in which a unique, not shown, cause 
results in three possible and mutually exclusive consequences; neutral vs. positive vs. 
negative. For different outcomes in each script, see table 1.  
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Table 1 
The different outcomes for each script 
Script Positive picture  Neutral picture Negative picture 
Morning  
Female finds roses in a 
cabinet 
Female takes a packet of 
biscuits out of a cabinet 
Female finds a spider 
in a cabinet 
 
Bicycle trip Female on a bike meets 
a friend 
 
Female on a bike 
entering a building 
Female on a bike is 
injured by a car 
Mountain hiking Male excited to have 
climbed mountain  
 
Male looking at a leaf Male falls down from 
the mountain 
Run 
 
 
Female wins a running 
competition  
Female changing her 
shoes  
Female hurts her ankle, 
loses the competition 
 
Gambling  Male wins a large 
amount of money  
 
Male playing on a slot 
machine 
Male loses a large 
amount of money  
Dating Male and female kiss Female gives a book to 
the male 
Male hits the female 
Note. For each script there are three different emotional outcomes. 
 
A series of 21 coloured photographs for each script were created. Eight photographs 
depicted actions typical for each event, which of one was always shown at the beginning of 
the script, and one was always shown at the end of the script. Two pictures depicted a 
positive outcome, two pictures depicted a negative outcome, and two pictures depicted a 
neutral outcome. One cause picture was created for each script, but not shown during 
encoding. Additionally, three pictures consistent with the script were labelled as new, and 
three pictures consistent with the script were labelled as old. The pictures labelled as old and 
new were used alternatively as target-pictures at encoding or distractors during recognition 
respectively (See appendix for an example of a script). Finally, stimuli also included 16 
photographs inconsistent with any of the scripts (e.g., boy playing chess, people playing on 
the beach and swimming in the ocean, or simple landscapes). Five of these photographs were 
shown at the beginning, and five at the end of every presentation during encoding to prevent 
primacy and recency effects. 
 
Recognition Phase 
  A unique sequence of 60 photographs in randomized order was shown to all 
participants. From each script there was: 
 a) A representative picture from the script, chosen from the six pictures showing typical 
series of situations occurring in the script 
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b) Three script-consistent photographs from the “new” labelled pictures, serving as a 
distractor 
c) Three script-consistent photographs chosen from the “old” labelled pictures, serving as a 
target photograph  
 d) One photograph depicting the common cause of the three possible outcomes (never 
presented at encoding) 
e) One, already viewed, inconsistent photograph serving as an unrelated target. 
f) One new script-inconsistent photograph serving as an unrelated distracter.  
 
 The three script-consistent distractor photographs were created for each script by 
forming two groups of three photographs, alternatively used as a target and distractors, 
counterbalanced for the conditions. These photographs were randomly presented with the 
restriction that they would never be placed in either the last or the first position, or to the slide 
right before the outcome photographs. 
 
Procedure  
 
 Encoding Phase 
  All participants were tested individually at school during school hours. The 
participants were seated in front of a computer screen that was placed on a table in front of 
them in a quiet room. They were instructed that they would see a number of photographs 
displaying people engaging in daily activities, and to watch every photograph carefully to try 
to understand what the photographs were attempting to convey. The children were not 
informed that the procedure would measure memory, as incidental encoding will have higher 
ecological validity than intentional learning. For each script, participants viewed 13 pictures 
in logical order. Each photograph appeared on the computer screen for two seconds, followed 
by a black screen also lasting for two seconds. Every participant saw one of the three possible 
outcomes for each script; two scripts with a positive outcome, two scripts with a neutral 
outcome, and two scripts with a negative outcome. The overall duration of the encoding 
phase was approximately six minutes.  
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Retention Interval 
 After the encoding phase, the participants were given a filler-task for the duration of a 
five minutes interval. The filler-task was a puzzle game, consisting of wooden blocks in 3D, 
and a cardboard where the purpose is to place the blocks within a specific pattern. This filler-
task was chosen to distract the children from the scripts they had just seen, and because it was 
possible to adjust the difficulty level according to age. Whereas the older children were 
instructed to try to complete the pattern with the blocks, the younger children were instructed 
to play with the blocks. The atmosphere during the experiment was meant to be comfortable 
and calm, and therefore small talk was also a part of the retention interval.            
    
Recognition Phase 
 After the retention interval, the children were asked to resume their position in front 
of the computer. They were informed that they would see more photographs, some of which 
they had never seen before, and some of which they had recently seen. For each picture 
presented, the child was instructed to respond either “yes” or “no” according to the child’s 
belief in whether the photograph was seen or not during encoding. Two researchers 
conducted the experiment, of which one always administered the test, whereas the other one 
always scored the children’s answers. Total duration of testing for each child was 
approximately 20 minutes.  
 
Ethical Considerations  
 
Before the recruitment of participants started, the study was evaluated by REK (The 
Regional Committees for Medical and Health Research Ethics), who concluded that the 
project fell outside the health-research jurisdiction, and did therefore not need any special 
approval from REK.                   
 Schoolteachers distributed enclosed envelopes, containing a detailed information 
letter and consent form, for the children to take home to their guardians. The guardians were 
instructed to sign the consent form if they wished for their child to participate in the study, or 
refrain from signing if they did not agree to their child’s participation. Instructions requested 
returning the envelope regardless of their willingness to participate. Guardians were also 
informed of their possibility to withdraw their children from the project at any time, without 
having to give any explanation.  
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Before testing, the children were informed verbally about the project and its purpose. 
They were also informed about their guardians’ consent, and asked to give their own consent 
to participate by writing down their name or their first letter. All children were informed that 
they could withdraw from the project at any time during testing without giving any reason.  
Statistical Analyses 
 
The children´s yes or no responses during the recognition phase were for analysis 
purposes coded into four different variables.  
1) Hit – correctly recognizing a previously seen picture 
2) Correct rejection – correctly rejecting a previously unseen picture 
3) False alarm – wrongly recognizing a previously unseen picture 
4) Miss – wrongly rejecting a previously seen picture 
 
Proportion Scores 
False recognition was calculated using proportions of raw scores for both false alarm 
and miss, and is used in the analysis if not otherwise stated.  
False recognition was calculated for six conditions respectively; Positive cause 
pictures, negative cause pictures, neutral cause pictures, positive gap-filling pictures, negative 
gap-filling pictures, and neutral gap-filling pictures. A 2 (picture type; cause vs. gap-filling) 
X 3 (emotion; positive vs. negative vs. neutral) X 3 (age; 6-8 vs. 9-10 vs. 11-12 years) 
repeated measures mixed factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA) with picture-type and 
emotion as within-group factors, and age as a between-group factor was conducted.  
 
Discrimination Accuracy Index and Response Criterion 
 The two-high threshold (Pᵣ) discrimination accuracy measure is a measure of how 
precisely participants are able to distinguish old from new pictures in a recognition-test 
(Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988). Pᵣ is a common measure of recognition memory, also with 
children (Augusti & Melinder, 2012; Bayen, Murnane, & Erdfelder, 1996; Johnson, Kounios, 
& Reeder, 1994; Pollak, Cicchetti, Hornung, & Reed, 2000).  Pᵣ is calculated based on hits 
and false alarms using the formula [Pᵣ = H - FA]. The two-high threshold model does not 
assume a continuum of memory strength, but defines discrete memory states. In a two-high 
threshold model there are two memory thresholds; one for old items and one for new items. 
These two thresholds define three states of memory; old recognition, new recognition, and 
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uncertainty. A studied item will be accepted if it exceeds the memory threshold, or if it is 
based on a guess (Yonelinas, Dobbins, Szymanski, Dhaliwal, & King, 1996). Old items 
crossing the old recognition threshold will therefore always be identified as old, whereas new 
items crossing the new recognition threshold will always be identified as new, by the 
participants (Snodgrass & Corvin, 1988). Items in the uncertain state will however be 
identified as either old or new, depending on the participant’s response bias, leading false 
alarms and misses occurring from an uncertain state.  
 The response criterion Bᵣ, [Bᵣ = FA/1-Pᵣ], is therefore defined as the probability of 
saying “yes” when in an uncertain state of having seen a picture before or not. A value of Bᵣ 
equal to 0.5 indicates a neutral bias, a value greater than 0.5 indicates liberal bias in where 
children are more prone to respond “yes”, whereas a value less than 0.5 indicates 
conservative bias, where children are more likely to respond “no” to whether they have seen 
a photograph before. 
 The two-high threshold (Pᵣ) discrimination accuracy measure was calculated for the 
neutral and the emotional scripts (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988), using corrected hits and false 
alarms. Similarly the response criterion (Bᵣ) was calculated to assess the response bias 
applied by the children.  
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Pilot Testing 
 
As the paradigm is rather new and not extensively used with children, pilot testing 
was conducted to heighten the reliability of the procedure. This is particularly important in 
developmental research, as valence and arousal ratings are indicated to be a function of age 
(Cordon et al., 2013). Because the photographs in the paradigm are developed in Italy, it was 
necessary to investigate how the procedure would work with Norwegian children, 
specifically, if the children would comprehend the plot in the scripts as well as the emotions 
the actors were trying to convey. A two-step pilot testing was performed.  
First, a qualitative part, including eight children (M age = 8.33, SD = 1.60, 2 girls) 
was conducted. The children were asked to describe the plot in all nine scripts, as well as 
explain the emotions of the actors in both the neutral, negative, and positive outcomes. The 
children were all able to do this, but with two exceptions. Some of the children had problems 
understanding the dating-script, and some were not able to differentiate the emotions in the 
neutral and the positive outcomes for both the birthday-script and the boy-script. A difference 
between Italy and Norway was also found: All the Norwegian children highlighted the fact 
that the actor in the bicycling-script was not wearing a helmet, and that the actor in the 
mountain-script did not secure his rope. This indicates that the children were paying close 
attention to the plots in the scripts. It is also worth mentioning that the gambling-script, which 
was thought to work less than well in Norway because of the lack of slot machines, did not 
raise any problems. The children were asked if they understood what the machine was for, 
and they were all able to explain its function. 
The results from the first pilot-test were used as a basis for the second part. The Self 
Assessment Manikin (SAM), a non-verbal pictorial assessment (Bradley & Lang, 1994; 
Cordon et al., 2013), was used. With the SAM-assessment manikin, the children (N = 18, M = 
9.25, SD = 1.80, 4 boys) rated both picture valence and arousal on a scale from 1-9.  
The cut-off values of SAM were decided based on the 9-point scale, and adapted from 
Cordon et al. (2013). The set cut-off value for negative outcome was 1-3, for neutral outcome 
it was 4-6, and for positive outcome 7-9. Table 2 displays the mean valence rating for the 
original nine scripts.  
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Table 2 
SAM-mean for the emotional valence response for the nine scripts 
 Morning Home Bicycle Mountain Run Gambler Boy Date Birthday 
Negative  3.00 2.67 3.00 2.16 3.00 2.50 2.00 2.33 4.00 
Positive 8.50 7.16 8.67 7.33 8.00 8.33 7.16 7.00 7.33 
Neutral 5.67 6.33 5.83 5.50 5.16 5.16 7.00 5.33 7.00 
Note. SAM-means that are not within the set cut-off values are in bold face.  
 
The birthday-script, where a young woman celebrates her birthday-party, was omitted, 
as the mean rating of the neutral outcome of the script was 7.00, which is above the cut-off 
value for neutral. As the mean for the positive version was only 7.33, the difference between 
these two was also quite low. The information from the qualitative pilot test supported this 
decision, as the children generally explained all the photographs as “happy” and positive, as 
this script takes place in a birthday-situation, which is a situation that can altogether be rated 
as rather pleasant. 
The second script omitted was the boy-script, where a boy visits the grocery store 
with his mother. This script had a high mean rating for the neutral outcome, which again was 
7.00. Here, the mean for the positive outcome was even more similar (7.16). Omitting this 
script was supported by the qualitative test, as the children stated that the positive and neutral 
photographs were rather similar, as they both display the boy meeting his friends.  
A series of one-way ANOVA were conducted to test if there was a significant 
difference between the ratings of valence. The children’s scores for valence as indicated on 
the SAM-assessment were used as the dependent variable. The independent variable was if 
they rated a negative, positive or neutral outcome. All seven remaining scripts reached 
significance, Morning script, F (2, 17) = 25.37, p = .000, ηp² = .08, Homecoming script, F (2, 
17) = 23.99, p = .00, ηp² 
 
=
 
.08, Bicycle script, F (2, 17) = 88.47, p = .00, ηp² 
 
= .09, Mountain 
script, F (2, 17) = 34.95, p = .00, ηp² 
 
= .08, Run script, F (2, 17) = 26.99, p = .00, ηp² 
 
= .07, 
Gambling script, F (2, 17) = 32.43, p = .00, ηp² 
 
= .08, and Date script, F (2, 17) = 24.31, p = 
.00, ηp² 
 
= .08. Post-hoc tests using Bonferroni indicated significant differently ratings of 
neutral, negative and positive scripts.  
The mean ratings for arousal on the different scripts were then further investigated. 
Means are presented in table 3. The scripts should stir a higher arousal for negative and 
positive versions of scripts than for neutral versions. The cut off-values for neutral outcomes 
were set to 1-4, and the cut off-values for positive and negative between 5-9, adapted from 
Cordon et al. (2013). The homecoming-script did not meet the above-mentioned cut-offs, and 
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was omitted. Another one-way ANOVA was conducted to explore if any remaining scripts 
should be omitted based on arousal level. All six remaining scripts were significantly 
different between neutral versions and both positive and negative versions, Morning script, F 
(2,17) = 3.94, p = .042,
 ηp² 
 
= .03, Bicycle script, F (2, 17) = 7.18, p = .006, ηp² = .05, 
Mountain script, F (2, 17) = 10.58, p = .001, ηp² 
 
= .06, Run script, F (2, 17) = 4.77, p = .025, 
ηp² 
 
= .04, Gambling script, F (2, 17) = 10.56, p = .001, ηp² 
 
= .06, and Date script, F (2,17) = 
4.65, p = .002, ηp² 
 
= .04. Post-hoc tests using Bonferroni indicated significant different 
ratings of neutral scripts from both negative and positive scripts, but not a significant 
difference between ratings for negative and positive scripts.  
 
Table 3 
SAM-mean for the emotional arousal response for the nine scripts 
 Morning Home Bicycle Mountain Run Gambler Boy Date Birthday 
Negative  6.00 4.17 6.17 7.17 6.50 6.83 5.83 6.50 5.33 
Positive 6.83 4.50 7.17 6.50 6.50 6.67 6.50 6.50 4.50 
Neutral 3.00 4.17 2.83 3.33 3.00 2.33 5.33 3.00 5.50 
Note. SAM-means that are not within the set cut-off values are in boldface.  
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Results 
 
Estimating Sample Size 
 
The sample size was estimated based on standard deviation and sample mean from a study 
using the same paradigm as the present one (Mirandola et al., 2013). Importantly, only means 
and standard deviation for negative and neutral valence, and not for positive valence and age, 
was used for the present estimates. This particular choice was based on the fact that one can 
usually find smaller differences in sample means for valence compared to age (Brainerd et 
al., 2010). If numbers from data on age had been used, a smaller sample size would have 
been estimated, and the later analysis might not have reached statistical significance due to 
the small sample size. As positive valence has not been included in former research with the 
same paradigm, it was not possible to find any data on this valence. A power of .80 was 
expected, and the p–value was set to .05. According to Howells’s (2012) appendix, this 
equals δ = 2.8. The estimated needed sample size was thus 56.3 ≈ 57.  
 
Preliminary Analyses  
 
To investigate gender differences in false recognition, an independent-samples t-test 
was conducted. This was to establish if there was a gender difference in distribution of misses 
and false alarms. There was not found a significant gender difference for neither false alarms, 
t (130) = 20.75, p =.457, ηp² = .004, nor misses, t (130) = 0.91, p = .362, ηp² = .01. 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to explore if the PowerPoint version viewed by 
the subject did affect overall memory errors in the experiment. The subjects were divided into 
three groups according to which PowerPoint presentation they watched, and thus which 
emotional ending to the six different scripts they viewed. All three PowerPoint versions 
contain two positive endings, two neutral endings and two negative endings, but not for the 
same scripts. As expected, there was not a statistically significant difference in memory 
scores depending on a PowerPoint version presented, F (2, 128) = 0.59, p = .943, ηp² 
 =
 .001.  
 To explore if there was a difference between the two elementary schools regarding 
false recognition, an independent-samples t-test was conducted with false alarms and misses 
as dependent test-variables. The participants from school 1 (M = 8.05, SD = 5.29) had on 
average more false alarms than school 2 (M = 5.70, SD = 3.89). This difference was 
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significant, t (130) = 2.84, p = .005, ηp² = .06. When looking at differences in misses between 
the two schools, no statistical difference was revealed. 
 To see if the differences in false alarms between the two schools could be due to age 
differences, a new independent t-test was conducted. The average age in school 1 (M = 9.38, 
SD = 1.93) was marginally higher than in school 2 (M = 8.76, SD = 1.96). This difference 
between schools was not significant, t (130) = 1.67, p = .098, ηp² = .02. However, with a 
slight difference between means and a small effect size between the two schools, the 
differences in total wrong answers were attributed to age differences between schools, and 
are therefore not included in further analyses.  
 
Main Analyses  
 
Proportion Scores 
A 2 (picture type; cause vs. gap-filling) X 3 (emotion; positive vs. neutral vs. 
negative) x 3 (Age; 6-8 vs. 9-10 vs. 11-12 years) repeated measures mixed factorial design 
was conducted, with picture-type and emotion as within-group factors, and age as a between-
group factor. The variables are calculated using proportion scores of misses and false alarms 
respectively. 
No significant main effect of age was found, F (2,126) = 2.96, p = .055, ηp² =.05. 
Post-hoc comparisons using Bonferroni adjustments revealed a trend of children aged 6-8 
years (M = 37.9, SD = 13.9) having a higher rate of false recognition than children aged 9-10 
years (M = 33.75, SD = 24.88), with a significance level of p = .051.  
A significant main effect of picture-type was revealed, F (1,129) = 88.04, p = .000, ηp² 
=.41. The rate of false recognition in gap-filling pictures (M = 22.20, SD = 15.35) was 
significantly lower than in cause pictures (M = 44.43, SD = 37.71), indicating that children 
made most mistakes on cause pictures.  
A significant main effect of emotion was revealed, F (2,128) = 6.51, p = .002, ηp² 
 
= 
.09. Post-hoc comparisons using Bonferroni adjustments revealed that children had 
significantly lower false recognition of positive scripts (M = 20.58, SD = 13.33) compared to 
negative (M = 24.64, SD = 12.88) and neutral (M = 25.58, SD = 15.15) scripts. The difference 
between neutral and negative scripts was not significant.  
The above-mentioned main effects were qualified by a significant interaction effect of 
picture-type and emotion, F (2,128) = 7.62, p = .001, ηp² 
  
= .11. Post-hoc comparisons using 
the Bonferroni test adjusted for multiple comparisons revealed that children had significantly 
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more false alarms for neutral cause pictures (M = 50.37, SD = 36.8) compared to positive 
cause pictures (M = 35.98, SD = 36.18). No other interactions between picture-type and 
emotion reached significance. Means and standard deviations are presented in table 4. 
 
Table 4 
Mean proportions (and standard deviations) of false recognition in gap-filling and causal errors as a 
function of emotion 
 Gap-filling    Causal errors  
Emotion      
Positive 21.75 (14.87)   35.98 (36.18)  
Neutral 21.2  (14.97)   50.37 (36.80)  
Negative  23.75 (16.19)    46.59 (40.13)  
 
The interaction between age and picture-type did not reach significance, F (2,129) = 
0.09, p = .914, ηp² 
 
= .001. The tendency in false alarms for both cause pictures and gap-
filling pictures was an age decline in false memories between children aged 6-8 and 9-10 
years, but an age increase in false memories between children aged 9-10 and 11-12 years. 
The means and standard deviations are presented in table 5, and the means are presented in 
figure 1.  
No other significant (p > .05) main or interaction effects were revealed.  
Table 5  
Mean proportions (and standard deviations) of gap-filling and causal errors (and associated false 
alarm and miss responses) as a function of age group 
 Gap-filling    Causal errors  
 False alarms Miss  False alarm  
Age-group      
6-8 years 14.41 (9.09) 11.98 (6.45)  49.41 (26.14)  
9-10 years 13.23 (11.27) 12.29 (9.80)  41.98 (28.70)  
11-12 years  14.57 (9.40) 13.13 (7.88)   46.11 (27.98)  
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Figure 1. Proportion of memory errors by age group, indexed by age 6-8 years. Age 6-8 is set as the 
reference category, with a constant score of 100. The other age-groups are compared to the results of 
age 6-8, indicating, in percent, if they had more or less errors relative to this age-group. The chart 
begins at 60 percent to better illustrate the trends. 
 
To further explore the interaction between age and false recognition, a one-way 
ANOVA was conducted to explore developmental trends in type of false answer (false alarm 
vs. miss) in gap-filling pictures. Cause pictures were not included in the analysis, as only 
false alarms are possible for this picture-type. There was not found a statistically significant 
effect of age group for false alarm, F (2, 131) = .21, p = .808, ηp²
 
= .003 or on miss, F (2, 
131) = .23, p = .796, ηp²
 
= .003. A trend towards different developmental courses was 
however indicated. For false alarms, there was no clear age-trend. For misses, there was a 
linear age-increase, with the youngest children having the lowest proportion of misses. The 
means and standard deviations are presented in table 5, and the means are presented in figure 
1. 
Discrimination Accuracy Index 
To investigate memory accuracy as a function of emotion, three Pᵣ-scores were 
calculated; two for emotional errors, positive and negative respectively, and one for neutral, 
using “old” and “new” gap-filling pictures. Pᵣ scores were calculated by subtracting corrected 
false alarm- rates from hit-rates. 
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 The Pᵣ scores were used in a 3 (emotion; positive vs. neutral vs. negative) X 3 (age; 6-
8 vs. 9-10 vs. 11-12 years) repeated measures mixed factorial design, with emotion as a 
within-group factor, and age as a between-group factor. 
 A main effect on age was found, F (2, 129) = 4.64, p = .011, ηp² = .07. A Post-hoc 
comparisons using Bonferroni revealed that the 9-10 year olds (M = .28, SD = .11) were 
significantly better at discriminating between “old” and “new” pictures than the 6-8 year olds 
(M = .22, SD = .14), p = .009. Further, there was no significant difference between 9-10 year 
olds and 11-12 year olds (M = .24, SD = .13), although the 9-10 year olds had fewer memory 
errors. There was no significant difference between 6-8 year olds and 11-12 year olds, and no 
main effect of emotion. No significant interaction effects appeared (p > .05), indicating that 
age does not impact discrimination accuracy regardless of emotions. 
 
Table 6 
Means and standard deviations for Pᵣ, Bᵣ, Hits and False alarms for the recognition-task 
Age-group 6-8 year 9-10 year 11-12 year 
Pᵣ    
Positive .23 (.13) .29 (.11) .25 (.12) 
Neutral .23 (.12) .28 (.12) .22 (.12) 
Negative .20 (.15) .27 (.11) .24 (.15) 
Bᵣ    
Positive .20 (.12) .17 (.09) .17 (.10) 
Neutral .15 (.08) .12 (.06) .14 (.06) 
Negative .21 (.13) .18 (.09) .18 (.10) 
Hits*    
Positive .39 (.10) .41 (.09) .38 (.11) 
Neutral .40 (.09) .41 (.08) .38 (.11) 
Negative .38 (.11) .40 (.08) .38 (.11) 
False alarms*    
Positive .16 (.11) .13 (.07) .13 (.09) 
Neutral .17 (.12) .14 (.08) .16 (.07) 
Negative .18 (.13) .14 (.08) .15 (.10) 
Note. Positively, neutrally, and negatively, valenced pictures. Pᵣ is a discrimination accuracy index, where 
higher value indicates a better ability to discriminate between «old» and «new» pictures in a recognition 
memory test. Bᵣ is a response criterion index set for the participant where a score above 0.5 is considered a 
liberal response bias, whereas a score below 0.5 is considered conservative. *Corrected hit- and false alarm-
scores are used to calculate Pᵣ and Bᵣ. 
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  Response Criterion 
A 3 (emotion; positive vs. neutral vs. negative) X 3 (age; 6-8 vs. 9-10 vs. 11-12 years) 
repeated mixed ANOVA was conducted using the response bias criterion (Bᵣ) set for each 
child when responding to the “old” and “new” gap-filling pictures in the recognition-phase as 
a dependent factor.  
 With a significant violation of the assumption of sphericity, the multivariate tests 
indicated a significant main effect of emotion on gap-filling scores using the Bᵣ response bias, 
F (2, 128) = 28.81, p = .00, ηp² = .31. Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons revealed a higher and 
more liberal bias for the positive scripts (M = .18, SD = .10) compared to the neutral scripts 
(M = .14, SD = .07), p = .00. There was also a significantly more liberal bias for the negative 
scripts (M = .19, SD = .11) compared to the neutral scripts, p = .00, indicating that the 
children were more likely to say “yes” for an emotional script rather than for neutral scripts.  
 There was no significant difference between the emotional scripts. No other 
significant main or interaction effects appeared (p > .05). This indicates that age does not 
impact children’s response bias in any of the emotional situations.  
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Discussion 
 
 When assessing memory using the discrimination accuracy index with corrected hits 
and false alarms, a significant main-effect of age was found. Children aged 9-10 years were 
significantly better at discriminating between “old” and “new” pictures compared to children 
aged 6-8 years. This finding partly confirms the first hypothesis of an age-decrease in 
memory distortion. However, no significant difference between the 6-8 year olds and the 11-
12 year olds emerged. Although not significant, 9-10 year olds were surprisingly slightly 
better than the 11-12 year olds at discriminating between “old” and “new” pictures. 
Children’s gap-filling errors were significantly fewer than causal errors regardless of 
age. As no age-related increases in memory distortions were revealed, the second hypothesis 
stating developmental reversals regarding causal errors, and age invariance in gap-filling 
errors, may be rejected.  
 Third, we postulated that false recognition would increase if the script was negative, 
and decrease if the script was positive. Partly supporting the hypothesis, children had a 
significantly lower rate of memory errors for positive scripts than for both negative and 
neutral scripts, but not higher for negative than for neutral scripts. A significantly more 
liberal bias for positive and negative vs. neutral scripts were found. No significant main 
effect of emotion was found using the discrimination accuracy index, indicating that 
children’s ability to discriminate between “old” and “new” pictures was not affected by the 
emotionality of the script. 
 
Age Related Performance in Recognition Memory   
 
The children aged 9-10 years significantly outperformed the younger ones in 
discriminating between “old” and “new” pictures. This effect was however not significant 
using proportion scores, although the same trend was evident. This general increase in 
memory accuracy corroborates previous research on children’s recognition memory 
(Ackerman, 1984; Lindsay et al., 1991; Davidson & Hoe, 1993). Abstract knowledge 
structures such as scripts for describing the temporal and causal sequences of events depend 
partly on language development (Goswami, 2008). In addition to language, children use other 
symbols such as pictures to encode and communicate their experiences. Symbolic 
understanding itself develops, and this development is thus a factor in explaining why older 
children outperform younger children on memory tests. A general notion that seems to be 
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consistent with the present results is that the development of ability to recognize previously 
encountered items, and to derive meaning from such items, occurs at the same time as the 
development of the ability to discriminate between memory traces, even those that are highly 
similar to previously encountered material (Ghetti et al., 2002; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & 
Lindsay, 1993).  
However, there was no general developmental increase in recognition memory 
between children aged 9-10 and 11-12 years. Surprisingly, there was a trend indicating older 
children to make more overall memory errors compared to the 9-10 year olds. This 
unexpected finding might be due to several reasons.  
 Recognition has by some been suggested to be a processing skill rather than a 
cognitive skill (Fagan, 1992), based on the notion that recognition memory seems to be fairly 
common for animals as well (Vaughan & Greene, 1984). Cognitive development studies 
might therefore not find much age-development in recognition memory. Brown and Scott 
(1971) found children between three and five years of age to remember 100 pictures of 
familiar situations with 98 % accuracy in recognition. Several other experiments have also 
failed to find a developmental difference in recognition tasks (Caroll, Byrne, & Kishner, 
1985; Ghetti et al., 2002; Naito, 1990). 
During recognition, the older children seemed more self-conscious, and worried about 
making memory mistakes compared to the younger children. This worrying may have 
contributed to them having more false alarms on both gap-filling pictures and causal pictures 
compared to the 8-9 year olds. The response bias did not show any significant age-
differences, thus the lack of an age difference between the younger and oldest children in the 
present study cannot be explained by the children’s response criterion. Another reason for 
this unexpected trend might be the somewhat lower sample of children aged 11-12 years (56: 
6-8 year olds vs. 43: 9-10 year olds vs. 33: 11-12 year olds).   
 
False Memories and Age 
 
 The present results showed no clear signs of the anticipated developmental reversals 
in false memories for causal pictures in particular. This finding is thus failing to support the 
FTT and previously reported research showing developmental reversals in false memory 
formation (Brainerd et al., 2004; see Brainerd & Reyna, 2012, for a review; Brainerd, Reyna, 
Ceci, & Holliday, 2008; Holliday et al., 2011; Howe, 2007; Lyons et al., 2010; Metzger et al., 
2008). FTT predicts that false memory effects may increase with age as a consequence of 
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developmental differences in the formation of gist traces (Ghetti et al., 2002). Because 
children get better at extracting the gist from what they see with age, the chance of creating 
false memories as a result of studying pictures or word-lists converging on a theme (i.e. gist) 
should also increase, causing the younger children to show reduced false memory for related 
distractors. However, gap-filling pictures should be exempt of this effect given that they are 
more reliant on verbatim memory compared to gist. Thus, the present findings support this 
notion by revealing non-significant age differences in false alarms and misses on gap-filling 
pictures.  
  Using the same Backward Causal-Inference Paradigm with children, Lyons and 
colleagues (2010) found developmental reversals in recognition memory, indicated by nine 
year olds being significantly more likely to make causal errors than six year olds. In the 
present study there was no significant difference in age on causal errors, but children aged 6-
8 eight years made more errors in general than children aged 9-10 years. Although the results 
of the present study are not significant, similar trends as reported by Lyons and colleagues 
(2010) can be detected, in that the oldest children aged 11-12 years conducted more causal 
errors than the children aged 9-10 years.  
 There may be several reasons for why the results in the present study differ from that 
of Lyons and co-workers (2010), and other developmental studies done with the aim of 
detecting developmental reversals in false memories (for a review, see Brainerd & Reyna 
2012). In the present study, children viewed six different scripts, whereas in Lyons and 
colleagues (2010) study, the children only viewed four scripts. Watching six different scripts 
might be too much for the youngest children, causing them to make more errors, and 
therefore masking the predicted developmental reversals.  
 Another plausible reason might be the manipulation of valence, which was varied 
within subjects. Three different outcomes of emotionality might be too much to grasp for the 
youngest children. The difference in results might be due to the developing ability to focus 
attention and grasp variety in stimuli instead of actually measuring developmental differences 
in false memory for emotional events. Older children become more aware and prepared for 
variation, whereas younger children have the tendency to overlook variation, and need more 
experience to comprehend and take variation into account (von Tetzchner, 2012). The age 
range included in the present study might have been too young and all children, regardless of 
age, might have been confused by the different valences and the number of story-scripts 
which in turn resulted in the lack of the expected developmental effect of picture type.  
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 Another reason for the lack of developmental reversals could be that the causal 
pictures for each script are not clearly enough related to the previously seen effect, and might 
therefore rather resemble a gap-filling picture, which is not predicted to cause any age-
difference. As before mentioned, former research has hypothesized the age-increase in 
memory errors to be due to older children’s and adult’s ability to connect the meaning of 
studied words and items, leading the critical lure to get coded along with the items studied 
during the encoding phase (Roediger & McDermott, 1995). This effect might not be present 
if the participants do not perceive the causal pictures as a cause to the event they just saw, 
and these pictures might therefore not trigger any causal explanation to the event during 
recognition. However, the present study did find significant differences in errors between the 
causal pictures and the gap-filling pictures. The children made significantly more causal 
errors as opposed to gap-filling errors, indicating that there was an actual qualitative 
difference between the picture-types.  
 The non-reversal effect revealed, might also be explained in line with previous 
critique of the DRM-lists method; that age-increases in memory errors potentially are due to 
age-related increases in children’s ability to detect relations among items on a word-list and 
not an direct effect of memory development (e.g. Brainerd, Reyna, & Ceci, 2008; Howe, 
2008; Lyons et al., 2010). Therefore, an age-increase in memory errors might not be as 
evident when using other methods like the Backward Causal-Inference Paradigm that, in 
contrast to the DRM-paradigm, does not rely on the ability to detect the overall theme of a 
word-list across multiple items, making it easier for younger children to remember previously 
encountered stimuli.         
Young children, compared to older children and adults, seem to be more dependent on 
cues to remember (Qin, Quas, Redlich, & Goodman, 1997; Reese, 2008). The pictorial 
stimuli given in a recognition phase may work as cues for the younger children, allowing 
them to score higher in recognition tests. Therefore, one might expect to find greater 
developmental differences in memory distortion using a recall test where no stimuli (e.g. 
pictures) are present to work as cues as opposed to a recognition test. This is in line with 
previous research indicating that the discrepancy between different age groups is larger when 
using recall tests compared to recognition tests (Ceci & Bruck, 1993; Ghetti et al., 2002). 
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Divergent Influences of Emotionality on Memory 
 
Partly in line with our hypothesis and previous research (Brainerd et al., 2010; 
Brainerd, Stein et al., 2008), positive scripts in the present study yielded significantly fewer 
false alarms than negative and neutral scripts. However, negative and neutral scripts did not 
significantly differ. 
When using the discrimination accuracy index, no effect of emotion on ability to 
discriminate between “old” and “new” photographs was revealed. In line with the present 
results, several other studies that found an effect of emotion on false memory, did not report a 
significant effect of emotion on memory when using discrimination accuracy indices (e.g., 
Johanson, Mecklinger, & Treese, 2004; Kensinger & Corkin, 2003, fifth experiment; 
Maratos, Allen, & Rug, 2000). Due to these inconsistent findings based on the way in which 
memory is measured, the impact of emotion on memory has been suggested to be due to 
other factors, such as response bias (Dougal & Rotello, 2007).  
In the present study, a significantly more liberal response bias for both positive and 
negative photographs compared to neutral photographs was found, indicating that the 
children were more likely to say “yes” when responding to emotional as opposed to neutral 
photographs.  No significant difference was found between response bias for negative and 
positive photographs. This indicates that even though the children were most likely to 
conduct false alarms on neutral distractors, they were more likely to accept either positive or 
negative distractors as previously seen when in an uncertain state. Previous research has 
indicated that as emotion changes from neutral to negative, a more liberal bias for accepting 
distractors as seen emerges in both children (Augusti & Melinder, 2012; Pollak et al., 2000) 
and adults (Johanson et al., 2004; Kapucu, Rotello, Ready, & Seidl, 2008). Dougal and 
Rotello (2007) therefore postulated the heightened level of both true and false memory for 
emotional stimuli to be a factor of response bias (i.e., a more liberal bias for emotional 
stimuli). This heightened liberal bias for emotional content rather than neutral content has 
been proposed to be a factor of an evolved ability to make faster decisions in more emotional 
situations (Phelps & Sharot, 2008). 
Several variables could explain why the liberal response bias, discrimination accuracy 
index, and proportion false alarms are differently affected by emotion. The small variance in 
arousal between different valences could for instance explain the somewhat atypical results 
for negative scripts. Valence is significantly different as a function of emotion (neutral, 
negative, and positive), whereas arousal is only differing between neutral and emotional 
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(negative and positive) scripts. Thus, as only valence is consistently different as a function of 
emotion of the scripts, it is not possible to distinguish if the effects of emotion are due to 
arousal or valence. The pilot-test is quite comprehensive in order to address this shortcoming. 
All scripts included in the experiment were significantly different between the three valences, 
which was qualified by moderate to large effect sizes for all scripts. Although the scripts 
were significantly different between levels of arousal for neutral vs. positive or negative 
stimuli, the effect sizes were small to moderate. This suggests that the scripts might not be 
arousing enough, as the mean arousal ratings revealed in the pilot test were towards the lower 
accepted values for negative and positive outcomes, and towards the higher cut-offs for 
neutral outcomes. The differences in arousal between valences are thus smaller than the 
differences in valence, and the arousal ratings for negative and positive pictures are not 
significantly different and thus not consistently manipulated. As valence and arousal are 
postulated to influence memory through different mechanisms and in different strength 
(Kensinger, 2004), this could explain the non-significant differences between negative and 
neutral stimuli. Previous research has found effects of negative valence only leading to 
poorer memory when high arousing (Kensinger, 2004). Higher arousal is thought to have a 
more automatic effect on memory, whereas the effect of positive and negative valence on 
memory might be due to conscious encoding strategies (Kensinger, 2004). As encoding 
strategies still develop in the age-range included in the present study (Goswami, 2008), the 
effects of differently valenced material might be lower in children of this age.     
 However, in a study conducted with children, Brainerd et al. (2101) found negative 
valence to elevate false alarms regardless of level of arousal. This indicates that negative 
valence alone should be enough to increase false alarms, an effect that should increase further 
with age (Rivers et al., 2008). As arousal intensifies the effect of valence (Brainerd et al., 
2010), a smaller effect should be found for lower arousing negative stimuli. The smaller 
differences in arousal as well as the young age of participants might therefore explain the 
unexpected results for negative stimuli in the present study. 
In addition, the effect of emotion was qualified by an emotion by picture-type 
interaction. This interaction does to a degree confirm the validity of the arousal and valences 
in the scripts, as the present study replicates the typical heightened effect of emotionality on 
causal errors, as neutral stimuli compared to positive stimuli were significantly associated 
with more causal errors. However, this heightened effect was only found for positive scripts, 
and not for negative scripts, which did not differ from neutral scripts. Previous research 
conducted using the same paradigm as the present one has indicated a significant effect of 
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emotion on cause pictures, but not on gap-filling pictures, for both children (Mirandola et al., 
2014) and young adults (Toffalini, Mirandola, Drabika, Melinder, & Cornoldi, 2014). The 
effect of emotionality was suggested to be higher on cause pictures as these are more tightly 
bound to the emotionality compared to gap-filling pictures, and gap-filling pictures thus 
being more indirectly influenced by emotionality (Brainerd, Stein et al., 2008; Mirandola et 
al., 2014). In the only child study using the same paradigm and including emotions as a 
within-group variable, typically developing children were found to have a higher proportion 
of false alarms for negative causes than for neutral causes (Mirandola et al., 2014). As this 
was found in a rather small sample (N=19), the difference in results compared to the present 
study is particularly interesting as there should be enough power in the present study to detect 
the same interaction if it in fact existed. These divergent results do nevertheless point towards 
an effect of emotion on cause pictures, an effect that was not significant for gap-filling 
pictures.  
In all, the overall trend of non-difference between neutral and negative stimuli is 
conflicting with the majority of other research, using the same (Mirandola et al., 2014) and 
other (for a review, see Brainerd and Reyna, 2012) paradigms. It does however fit with the 
typical developmental trends for negative stimuli as the high level in false alarms for negative 
stimuli has been found to develop with age (Brainerd et al., 2010), with the higher degree of 
false memories for negative stimuli relative to positive stimuli emerging between the ages of 
seven and 11 years. The robust larger effect of negative stimuli on false alarms (Brainerd, 
Stein et al., 2008) might therefore not be developed yet in the present sample of children, as 
the children’s mean age is quite young. Although there was no significant interaction 
between age and emotionality on false alarm, there were different developmental trends for 
the emotions. The difference in proportion of false alarms between the ages of 6-8 years and 
9-10 years was larger for negative than for positive stimuli, and the oldest age group had the 
most mistakes on negative stimuli, fitting with the theory of an age-increase in false alarms 
for negative stimuli (Brainerd et al., 2010). The developmental increase in false alarms for 
negative stimuli could thus be postulated to not yet have emerged in the children tested in the 
present study. The tendencies of a more liberal bias for emotional stimuli, combined with the 
higher degree of false errors in negative and neutral scripts, show a particularly important 
tendency for false memories in negative situations. This supports the previous found 
tendencies of negative stimuli not protecting against false memory, but rather the opposite 
(see Brainerd & Reyna, 2012, for a review).  
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It is important to keep in mind that this is at the present date the first study to research 
both negative and positive vs. neutral effects on gap-filling and causal interference with a 
developmental perspective. The untypical finding for negative stimuli and developmental 
reversals might therefore be a factor of criterion validity –previous research might measure 
slightly different mechanisms than the present one.  
 
Limitations of the Present Study 
 
The present experiment is a laboratory study, and is therefore somewhat limited when 
applied to real-life situations. From an applied perspective, the results from this study are 
more applicable to memory for passive bystanders.  However, the scripts display everyday-
situations, with events such as falling in a race or finding a spider. These events are less 
arousing than witnessing a robbery or other criminal situations. Particularly when concerning 
children, ethical considerations are of great importance. This limits both number of morally 
accepted ways of conducting experiments, and what stimuli can be included. On the other 
hand, a laboratory study allows for controlled investigation of theoretically driven 
phenomena by minimizing the effect of potentially confounding variables.   
 The scripts displayed, such as dating, are not as common or interesting for all age 
groups. What people remember of a picture is influenced by how they encode it (Schacter, 
1996), and people typically remember different aspects of stimuli based on their own 
background and interests. Children participating in the present study highlighted different 
aspects of the scripts displayed. When talking after the experiment, several children 
explained how they linked aspects of the pictures to their own lives. Some also asked to see 
the pictures again, whereas some children were clearly less interested. It is important to note 
that all the scripts in the present study display only adults, possibly causing the scripts to be 
less relevant and interesting for the children.      
 Another possible problem with the study could be the number of scripts, as six scripts 
with a total of three different emotions might demand too much of the children’s attention. 
Particularly for the younger children, the effects of the emotions might cause a spill over-
effect that in turn might have affected the results.  
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Future Directions 
 
 Larger effects of developmental reversals have been found in studies also including 
older participants (Mirandola et al., 2013), indicating the importance of investigating the 
effect of emotion on false memory with an even larger age-span. This could be particularly 
interesting regarding the effects of positive stimuli, as little is known about the 
developmental trajectories of the effect this induces on false memory. A larger age-span 
could also be interesting regarding response bias, as a developmental effect on liberal bias 
between childhood and adolescence has been indicated (Cordon et al., 2013), with only adults 
eliciting a significantly more liberal response bias for negative than for neutral pictures. The 
present study did not find an interaction between age and emotionality for response criterion; 
however, this might be due to the limited age range included in the present study. Thus, more 
developmental research on the interaction between response criterion and all three emotions 
would be interesting, as there are no overall clear tendencies on the effect of age on response 
criterion, which has been postulated to be behind the effect of emotion on false memory 
(Dougal & Rotello, 2007).  
 From an applied perspective, the tendencies regarding developmental reversals are 
important to investigate further, as there is still not consensus on exactly how much and in 
which ways development affects false memory (Magnussen, 2004). The importance of more 
research on the subject is stressed by the divergent opinions and understanding of how false 
memories operate, both by the general population (Magnussen et al., 2006), and by experts 
such as judges (Magnussen, Melinder, Stridbeck, & Raja, 2010; Magnussen et al., 2008), and 
psychologist (Magnussen & Melinder, 2012) as well as by researchers (Patihis, Ho, Tingen, 
Lilienfeld, & Lofthus, 2013; see Sabbagh, 2009, for a review). The opinion and knowledge 
these groups have for false memory could be particularly important in a courtroom, where 
they act as deputies, judges, or expert witnesses. To be applicable in a court of law, research 
in false memory must simulate relevant situations. This paradigm should aim to include 
material that is as close to children’s reality as possible, thus increasing the generalizability of 
future studies. Future studies should therefore aim to improve the child-appropriateness of the 
scripts, with scripts displaying situations that are more typical and interesting for all age 
groups of children, and primarily using children as actors in the scripts.  
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Concluding Remarks  
 
The aim of the present study was to investigate how emotion influences memory 
errors, from a developmental-perspective. The impact of age, picture-type, and emotionality 
on recognition memory was studied with the Backwards Causal-Inference Paradigm. Results 
indicated that memory performance increases from the ages of 6-8 to 9-10 years, whereas no 
further age increases or decreases were detected. In addition, a lower degree of memory 
errors was detected for positive stimuli compared to neutral and negative stimuli. A higher 
liberal bias was indicated for both positive and negative scripts compared to neutral scripts.  
The dispute regarding formation of memory distortions seems to be endless, 
particularly concerning children. More controlled research is desirable to untangle this 
dispute, from both an applied and a scientific perspective. The present study attempts to 
clarify this debate, specifically regarding the impact of both negatively and positively 
perceived events, and the similarities and differences between the two. As positive events are 
indicated to have a protective effect against memory errors, with the same tendency not 
present for negative events, this suggests a qualitative difference in how emotions affect 
memory in children.    
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Appendix 
Example of the Bicycle Script  
Encoded photographs: 
        
          
                or                       
 
 
 
      or          
                        
Tested photographs:          
           
         TARGETS 
           
   DISTRACTORS           CAUSE 
 
 
(non-
presented 
CAUSE) 
Positive emotional 
consequence 
Neutral non-
emotional 
consequence 
Negative emotional 
consequence 
